Chapter 6: three respects — generic, animal, human moral
simply say the generative faculty is a moral faculty? I only said: that the corruption of nature, being universal, corrupted even the generative faculty itself, insofar as it is a certain moral faculty. I therefore meant not that it is absolutely moral, but in a certain respect. And it can be viewed in three ways: first, as a certain faculty or generic property: so viewed it is a faculty of the vegetative soul, merely physical and brute, and aims to beget nothing but a vegetal thing. Second, as an animal faculty attempting the generation of an animal, and so the production of the sensitive soul itself: so it can be called a faculty of the sensitive soul, by whose sensitive appetite it is excited and applied to generating. Finally it can be viewed as a faculty of man depending somehow not only on the sensitive appetite but also on the will, and aiming at the generation not of a dog or lion or other brute animal, but of a man. So far it can be called moral, insofar as it works seed that a rational animal endowed with moral faculties may be produced, and is excited and applied to that by the moral faculties—will and sensitive appetite.
Latin
PLAC. Egone simpliciter dixi, facultatem genitricem esse facultatem moralem? tantum dixi: corruptionem naturae universalis cum esset, etiam ipsam facultatem genitricem, quatenus moralis quaedam facultas est, corrupisse. Significavi igitur non absolute moralem esse, sed quodam respectu. Tribus autem modis spectari potest, uno, ut est facultas quaedam seu proprietas generica: quo modo spectata facultas est animae vegetativae mere physica & bruta: nihilque intendit gignere, nisi rem vegetantem. Altero, ut est facultas animalis moliens generationem animalis, atque adeo ipsius animae sensitivae productionem: quomodo dici potest facultas animae sensitivae, cuius appetitu sensitivo excitatur ad generandum, & applicatur. Denique spectari potest ut est facultas hominis pendens aliquomodo non solum ab appetitu sensitivo, sed etiam a voluntate, & intendens generationem non canis, aut leonis, aut alius animalis bruti, sed hominis. Eatenus dici potest moralis, quatenus elaborat semen ut producatur animal rationale praeditum facultatibus moralibus, & excitatur ac applicatur ad eam rem facultatibus moralibus, voluntate & appetitu sensitivo.